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This is a time of spirited debate about company law reform in Europe. 
Discussions about the role of the European Union in the development of 
company law abound. Who is responsible for setting the agenda and 
controlling the legislative outcome? The further harmonization attempts 
and the introduction of the European Company Statute by the European 
Commission questions the necessity of EU intervention into the company 
laws regulated by the member states. 
This article analyzes the history of EU company law and locates a stable 
“non-competitive equilibrium”. This equilibrium follows from member 
states that founded the EU unwilling to give up their lawmaking 
authority regarding company law issues. From the outset, member states 
were determined to prevent the ‘Delaware-effect’. Since then, stability 
has ruled. The agenda-setting in EU company law changed little during 
the existence of the EU. Operative incentives, market structure, and 
regulatory results have been more constant than dynamic, even as the 
recent enactment of the European Company has triggered discussion 
about competitive lawmaking in Europe.  
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
For well over four decades, the European Commission (EC) was locked 
in a battle with member states over the introduction of a new legal form, 
the European Company. Although the EC initially assumed that this 
business form would provide a complete set of uniform rules without 
reference to national law, over time the EC embraced a significantly 
more flexible approach in respect of national law in order to reach 
agreement on default provisions for employee involvement and the 
choice of board structure. Indeed, the European Council and Parliament 
approved in October 2001 a Regulation that has a limited number of 
provisions, which deal with the formation of a European Company, its 
governance structure, employee involvement and its real seat, and a 
Directive that regulates employee involvement. The initial skeptical 
reaction to the passage of the new legislation is entirely consistent with 
the repeated and troublesome attempts to secure an agreement on the 
new company form. The dominant view is that the absence of uniform 
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rules brings few benefits in comparison to national business forms and 
the cumbersome rules do not facilitate cross-border mergers.1         
 Many company law scholars, nevertheless, view the new Regulation 
with a mixture of hope and skepticism, arguing that, in the context of 
agreed employee involvement, the new company law form could 
stimulate regulatory competition.2 An alternative view holds that the 
ultimate appeal of the new company law vehicle, compared to other 
national level company law vehicles, is due, if anything, to absence of 
legal rules on shares, financing and legal capital.3 Proponents argue that 
the renvoi technique, used by the European Company Statute, creates the 
possibility for some firms to choose their place of central administration 
according to the law of the member state that offers the most attractive 
benefits.   
 In this article, we argue that the European Company Statute could 
very well rekindle the interest in and discussions on competitive 
lawmaking within the EU. The EU, through the Statute, creates for the 
first time the possibility for reincorporation without liquidation of the old 
firm and the formation of an entirely new company. The Statute’s 
incompleteness and the significant differences in the national legislations 
may, we recognize, give rise to firms engaging in regulatory arbitrage.4 
The central question is whether the European Company Statute is a 
sufficiently attractive tool for larger firms to engage in forum shopping 
activities. There are a number of reasons, however, to believe that the 
legislation is unlikely pose a competitive threat to member states. First, 
as tax scholars have noted, the Statute does not contain tax provisions, 
leaving it up to national laws, international tax treaties and other 
European regulation to sort out the problem of taxation.5 Second, the 
European Company will be taxed, in absence of a consolidated common 
tax based with the possibility of offsetting losses in different member 
states, in the member state where its head office is located on the basis of 
its world-wide taxation, leading in the cases of branches to double 
                                                     
1 See Lombardo and Pasotti (2004) (summarizing criticisms). 
2 See Rickford (2003: 140-141) (assessing the competitive effects of the European 
Company Statute). 
3 See Enriques (2004: 10-15). 
4 Regulatory arbitrage is the choice by firms to locate investment or other economic 
activity based on the regulatory environment of jurisdictions. See Woolcock (1996: 298); 
Enriques (2004). 




taxation. Third, even if lawmakers eventually eliminate the tax obstacles 
to the use of the European Company Statute, it is unlikely, due to legal 
uncertainty, that firms will move from existing business statutes which 
continue to give them significant cost advantages. In additions to the 
arguments given above, we believe that the some member states, 
particularly Germany, have substantial incentives to discourage other 
governments from agreeing to EU-legal tax rules that would encourage 
cross-border reorganizations. In particular, our analysis may provide an 
explanation for the regulatory strategy of limiting the mobility of 
companies within the EU.  
 Accordingly, this article focuses on the evolution of company law at 
the EU and member state level and explores how the promulgation of the 
Regulation regarding the European Company affects this development.6 
Its emphasis is on elucidating lawmaking processes, and not on 
comparing legal rules and doctrines. The aim therefore is to explain and 
assess the process by which company law evolves, rather than to 
evaluate the content of the law in several jurisdictions. This article seeks 
to address the questions of which parties are responsible for setting the 
agenda for the reform of company law, and which considerations have 
been instrumental in constraining the emergence of a European 
Delaware. 
 It is particularly tempting to compare the lawmaking process in 
Europe with the development of company law statutes in the United 
States. There are two reasons that make the European Union and the 
United States suitable candidates for a comparative study. First, like the 
United States, the European Union can be viewed as a federation in 
which the individual countries retain considerable sovereignty, while at 
the same time allocating important prerogatives to a supranational 
government.7 Second, because US firms of all sizes have long been 
operating throughout the nationwide market without severe constraints 
                                                     
6 Council Regulation 2157/2001/EC [2001] OJ L 294/1. See also, the Council Directive  
2001/86/EC [2001] OJ L 294/22 (supplementing the statute for a European Company 
with regard to the involvement of employees). 
7 In contrast to the United States, the European Union is not a superstate. However, it is 
more than just a free-trade area. It is an arrangement of countries, of which the shape and 
purpose have been adapted to changing circumstances with remarkable ingenuity. Cf. 
Micklitz and Weatherill (1997: 1-3) (arguing that unlike the US, the EU is not a 
federation of states, but a ‘market without a State’). 
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regarding company law, the federal system has set a benchmark for the 
European Union.8 Viewed in this context, the emulation of the US 
approach regarding the evolution of company law seems logical. The 
development of legal rules in the United States – as a result of 
competition between jurisdictions – does appear to have essential lessons 
for Europe as it embarks on the modernization of company law in 
general. In the evolving pattern of EU company law, the European 
Commission and the European Court of Justice (ECJ) have until recently 
consistently avoided intervention into the national legislation of member 
states that has limited cross-border mobility of firms. The decision not to 
intervene has reinforced the member states’ strategy to avoid taking 
steps to create a market for corporate charters which could ultimately 
displace the lawmaking autonomy of the member states.9  
 Even though the threat of competition continues to be a defining 
feature of the market for closely held firms and holding companies, the 
possibility of free choice for publicly listed firms is thwarted due to tax 
and other national law barriers, which have been reinforced by 
harmonizing company law rules by Directives. The combination of the 
real seat doctrine along with exit taxes proved capable of creating a 
stable, long-run non-competitive equilibrium. With the core company 
law agenda defined by member states, the role of Brussels was merely to 
protect the cooperative agreement between member states – by limiting 
incentives for the emergence of a European Delaware – and to protect 
the public interest. Since its inception, the cooperative equilibrium has 
remained stable and largely intact, due to learning and adaptive changes 
made by the member states and the European Commission. But, as 
demonstrated in the US, the breakdown of a highly stable equilibrium 
could occur rapidly.10 While it is difficult to foresee with certitude the 
conditions that could lead to the breakdown of an equilibrium strategy in 
the EU, it is argued, nevertheless, that the stability of the equilibrium 
depends crucially on the continued ability of member states to protect 
                                                     
8 Cf. Moussis (1992) (‘[t]he new enterprise policy of the Community has three broad 
objectives: to create a legal framework which lends itself to the setting up and 
development of enterprises in the Community; to create an economic environment which 
will help enterprises reach their full development in the internal market; and to promote 
cooperation between enterprises situated in different regions of the Community.’). 
9 See McCahery and Vermeulen (2004). 
10 See Bratton and McCahery (2004) (explaining the factors that contributed to the 




their present legal system against possible competitive pressures from 
other member states. Indeed, a close examination of the European 
Company Statute confirms our view that the legislation is unlikely to 
facilitate firm mobility in the EU. Thus, we presume that the defects in 
the legislation simply reflect the core characteristics of the EU company 
law regime.  
 This article is divided into 5 sections. Section 2 turns to examine the 
US market-based system for corporate charters. A notable feature of the 
EU is that it tends to look to the operation of Delaware and the charter 
market with suspicion. In the US, a growing number of commentators 
have argued that the charter market is sub-optimal because Delaware 
faces little competition from the other states. The absence of competition 
in the charter market calls into question the description of Delaware, as 
emblematic of a particular form of market-based lawmaking, used by EU 
regulators to justify policies to reinforce the cooperative arrangement 
between member states and prevent the ‘Delaware-effect’.11  
 Section 3 recounts the evolution of the EU company law 
harmonization program from 1957 through the recent enactment of the 
European Company Statute. This account shows that the aim of the EU 
was to limit the right of establishment of pseudo-foreign companies and 
create barriers to the introduction of charter competition.12 This 
discussion goes on to describe the emergence of a non-intervention 
approach of EU lawmaking, excluding federal level regulators from 
disrupting state level accords between interested parties that are reflected 
in company law legislation. In this view, it is not surprising that an early 
strategy of the European Commission to introduce a truly EU-level 
company statute, to compete against the national level business forms, 
was systematically blocked by the member states who viewed an EU 
company form as a means to escape stricter national company law 
legislation. The compromise legislation, however, fails to offer a truly 
‘pan-European’ business form, presenting an opportunity for firms to 
                                                     
11 In this paper, we assess the prospects for a single jurisdiction dictating the 
developments in the area of company law in the EU. As we discuss in the next section, 
Delaware plays this role in the context of the US state system of company lawmaking. 
We, however, do not consider whether Delaware has a suboptimal impact on the quality 
of legal rules.  
12 Pseudo-foreign corporations are firms that are incorporated in one state but conduct a 
significant amount of their business in another state. 
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reincorporate to a more beneficial legal system. Section 4 considers the 
evidence whether the status quo in EU company law is indirectly 
challenged by the recent enactment of the European Company. Section 5 
offers a brief conclusion. 
 
2. THE DELAWARE-EFFECT 
The US legal system traditionally views company law in general as a 
local matter reserved to the states’ governments.13
 
Consequently, the 
corporation statutes of some states may differ appreciably from those of 
most other states on many critical matters. Once US business owners 
decide to incorporate, they must select an attractive state of 
incorporation. Under traditional conflict-of-law rules,14 courts will 
respect this choice even if the corporation in question has no other 
contact with the chosen state. The corporate laws of the incorporating 
state govern the basic rights and duties of a corporation and its 
participants.  
 At the end of the 19th century, New Jersey and Delaware, concerned 
about incorporation decisions, adopted modernized general incorporation 
statutes.15 Eventually, Delaware’s statute made it the leading 
incorporation state in the United States since the 1920s,16 presently 
serving as the state of incorporation for nearly half of the corporations 
listed on the New York Stock Exchange and more than half of all 
Fortune 500 firms.17 In addition, Delaware is also the leading destination 
for firms that opt to reincorporate. Clearly, Delaware’s value to 
incorporating firms is more than an up-to-date statute. The possibility of 
other states rapidly free-riding on the efforts and resources of the 
Delaware legislature by copying its statute would entail Delaware’s lead 
                                                     
13 See Bebchuk (1992: 1438) (noting that even though federal law governs some 
important issues, including insider trading, disclosure and the making of tender offers, 
much of the law regulating a corporation’s affairs stems from its state of incorporation). 
See also Leleux (1968) (comparing the European and the US situation). 
14 See Ribstein (2001: 825-827). 
15 With its 1888 corporation statute and the 1896 revision, New Jersey was the first state 
to enter the competition. Delaware joined New Jersey in 1899. 
16 See, e.g., Bebchuk (1992: 1443) (‘[a]fter restrictive amendments to its corporation law 
were made in 1913, New Jersey lost the leading role to Delaware, whose corporation law 
was at the time a close copy of New Jersey’s original statute.’). 
17 See Romano (1993: 6-12). See also Fisch (2000: 1061) (‘incorporations bring 




being exhausted in a very short period of time.18 For instance, the less 
easily replicated judicial expertise and other enduring advantages, such 
as a well-developed corporate case law, learning and network benefits, 
herd behavior,19 and the superiority of Delaware’s specialized chancery 
court, arguably preserve Delaware’s leading position over time.20  
 Delaware’s corporate law plays a key role in the evolution of 
companies in the United States, because Delaware law provides an 
alternative set of rules which serve firms and their legal advisers across 
the country. Consequently, many commentators have dealt with the 
vexed question of whether the choice of Delaware’s corporate law 
eventually leads to value maximization. In other words, is regulatory 
competition better described as a ‘race to the bottom’ or as a ‘race to the 
top’? 
 Some commentators continue to point to possible shortcomings of the 
competitive process that ensue from the divergence between the interests 
of managers and public shareholders.21 In their view, the development of 
state anti-takeover legislation perfectly exemplifies the shortcomings of 
regulatory competition. Because of the ability of firms’ management to 
capture state legislation, states (including Delaware) have developed 
anti-takeover statutes and judicial decisions permitting the use of 
defensive tactics that are overly protective of incumbent managers at the 
expense of shareholders.22 If the possibility of shareholder exit by tender 
to a hostile offeror is severely threatened, market mechanisms cannot 
adequately align the interests of managers and shareholders. By 
providing a constant and credible risk of hostile acquisitions, the 
                                                     
18 One should distinguish this process from legal transplantation, emulation or imitation. 
The latter occurs when laws are changed in the absence of pressures on the legislature in 
economic and political markets. See Sun and Pelkmans (1995); Woolcock (1996: 297-
298). 
19 See Coffee (1999: 703) (arguing that corporations may prefer to locate in a popular 
jurisdiction of incorporation for reasons that are simply based on its popularity, not the 
inherent superiority of its law). ‘Herd behavior loosely refers to a situation in which 
people imitate the actions of others and in so doing ignore, to some extent, their own 
information and judgments regarding the merits of their decisions.’ See Kahan and 
Klausner 1996: 355). 
20 See, e.g., Fisch (2000: 1063); Kahan and Kamar (2001: 1212-1214); Romano (1985); 
(1998: 365). 
21 See Bebchuk (1992); Bebchuk et al. (2002). 
22 See Bratton and McCahery (1995: 1887–1889). 
 9 
takeover market creates a powerful incentive for managers to restrain 
from managerial self-dealing. Assuming that the ‘market-for-corporate-
control’ is economically efficient in that it increases firm value, 
regulatory competition has serious implications for the race-to-the-top 
thesis. Consequently, according to this argument, mandatory federal 
rules should at least ensure that the market for corporate control remains 
active, robust, and competitive.23  
 It is doubtful, however, that US company laws will be placed under 
federal jurisdiction in the near future. Although it is conventional 
wisdom among US scholars that regulatory competition produces a race-
to-the-top with respect to some areas of corporate law,24 it certainly has 
its flaws. First, states do not pursue regulatory competition solely by 
offering rules that meet their clients’ needs. High-powered interest 
groups within a particular state induce the competitive process because 
of considerable tangible benefits. It has been argued that Delaware’s 
corporation law is devised to maximize the amount of work performed 
by lawyers who are members of the Delaware Bar.25 By providing 
standards and ambiguous default rules rather than rules that are clear in 
application, Delaware law enhances the amount of litigation in the 
state.26 Delaware lawmakers thereby respond to the lobbying efforts of 
in-state lawyers who are able to capture a considerable share of the 
incorporating revenues, due to litigation-increasing standards. 
 Furthermore, since Delaware can rely on its dominant position in the 
market for incorporations, it could allow itself to prevent the emergence 
of optimal legal rules that would prevail in a perfectly competitive 
market.27 Finally, recent empirical research indicates that regulatory 
competition in the context of corporate law is imperfect as not only the 
product quality, but also the location of the ‘seller’ plays a pivotal role.28 
It appears that since firms display a marked home preference with 
respect to company law rules, states are more successful in retaining in-
state firms than attracting out-of-state business formations.29  
                                                     
23 See Bebchuk (1992); Bebchuk and Ferrell (1999). 
24 See Bebchuk and Ferrell (1999: 1171). 
25 See Macey and Miller (1987: 491–498). 
26 See Bratton and McCahery (1995: 1887–1888); Kahan and Kamar (2001: 
1217). 
27 See Kahan and Kamar (2001: 1252). 
28 See Bebchuk, Cohen and Ferrell (2002). 




 Thus, Delaware closely resembles a monopolistic ‘seller’ possessing 
market power and competitive advantages that other jurisdictions cannot 
replicate.30 The increasing return mechanisms act as substantial barriers 
to other states wishing to enter the market for out-of-state business 
formations. Since the radical change in company lawmaking in the late 
19th century, the Delaware-equilibrium has ruled. Delaware has played 
and still plays a pivotal role as the national lawmaker in the US, 
protecting itself from other states and federal interference by responding 
to interest group pressures.31 It follows from this discussion that 
regulatory competition may not automatically yield an efficient outcome. 
Its legal product, however, is arguably superior to what a centralized 
regime would produce.32 
 
3. THE EUROPEAN “NON-COMPETITION” STRATEGY 
The Treaty of Rome (1957) between France, West Germany, Italy, 
Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg established the European 
common market. The Treaty provided for the right of establishment for 
foreign corporations to establish branches in another member state, 
without being subject to more restrictive company law provisions of the 
host state.33 At the time, the real seat theory, which provides that the 
laws of the host state are applied if the actual centre of the corporation’s 
activities has moved to the host state, was still dominant although many 
feared it was losing ground since the Netherlands had recently 
abandoned the doctrine. Furthermore, provision 293 (ex 220) of the 
Treaty,34 which invited the member states, for instance, to enter into 
negotiations regarding the 1968 Brussels Convention on the Mutual 
Recognition of Companies and Legal Entities, would have abandoned 
the real seat theory in favor of the incorporation doctrine.35 Recall that 
                                                     
30 See Bebchuk and Hamdani (2002). 
31 See Financial Times (2004). 
32 See Bratton and McCahery (2004). 
33 See Leleux (1968); Buxbaum and Hopt (1988) (explaining that the freedom of 
establishment guaranteed by the Treaty proscribes use of the real seat theory). 
34 The Treaty of Amsterdam renumbered the articles of the Treaty. 
35 Article 293 (ex 220) of the Treaty provides that ‘Member States shall, so far as 
necessary, enter into negotiations with each other with a view to securing for the benefits 
of their nationals: 
 … 
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the real seat doctrine was developed in opposition to the opportunistic 
conduct of island jurisdictions attempting to lure foot-loose firms at the 
expense of higher cost jurisdictions. Drawing on the concepts of 
evolutionary game theory, we see that, prior to the 20th century, Belgium 
played a non-cooperative game vis a vis France, which enabled French 
managers to change their state of incorporation. The threat of losing 
firms to foreign jurisdictions provided the impetus for the introduction of 
the real seat doctrine in Europe.36 
 In these circumstances, the Treaty would have arguably enhanced the 
introduction of a market for corporate charters for companies. The 
reaction to this was split. The founding member states, such as France 
and West Germany who feared the consequences of an outbreak of a so-
called ‘race-to-the-bottom’ reacted in the 1960s by binding existing 
members and new entrants to accept the harmonization of their company 
laws. More specifically, France was concerned that the Netherlands, 
which had a flexible company law code, would be able to attract a large 
number of pseudo-corporations.37 The European Commission’s preferred 
solution to this problem was the top-down harmonization of national 
company laws. Under this strategy, the member states entered into a 
cooperative game in which the parties agreed, in exchange for political 
benefits or rents, to desist from opportunism in exchange for 
membership in the Community.38 From this discussion, it should be clear 
                                                                                                                      
‘the mutual recognition of companies or firms within the meaning of the second 
paragraph of Article 48 (ex 58), the retention of legal personality in the event of 
their seat from one country to another, and the possibility of mergers between 
companies or firms governed by the laws of different countries.’ 
  
So far, there has been one attempt to meet the obligation of Article 293: the 1968 
Brussels Convention on the Mutual Recognition of Companies and Legal Entities. As 
early as 1956, the Hague Conference on Private International Law drafted a treaty on the 
mutual recognition of the legal personality of companies. Both attempts failed. See 
Rammeloo (2001: 24-37). 
36 See Charny (1991: 428). 
37 The European Commission established, in 1960s, the first expert committee to analyze 
the effects of different capital income taxation policies of the member states. The 
Netherlands and Luxembourg, which had an interest in developing their thriving capital 
markets, successfully impeded the harmonization of capital taxation to protect their 
successful policy of opening their borders. Cf. Holzinger (2003). 
38 See Timmermans (2003: 628). Political rather than economics rents were considered 
more valuable to member states given their concern for political stability and economic 




that the small number of member states could negotiate and enforce a 
political agreement that protected their domestic national stock, which 
produced both fiscal and political benefits for these governments. It 
should be clear that the combined effect of these benefits outweighed the 
value of the payoffs of competitive lawmaking. 
 During the 1970s a number of countries also entered the EU for 
similar reasons of political stability and economic integration. Even 
though the new entrants, Denmark, Ireland and the United Kingdom, 
endorsed the incorporation regime,39 which could easily have reinforced 
the possibility of the out-migration of domestic companies, the 
cooperative equilibrium was sufficiently stable to neutralize this 
tendency. The cooperative agreement also included another element. The 
member states would only agree to the harmonization of their national 
laws if this could be achieved without the alteration of the core 
components of company law.40 This confirms the expectation that 
member states would also respect each other’s lawmaking autonomy.  
 The first generation directives restated,41 in effect, the content of the 
member states’ national laws.42 Rigid and complete ‘top-down’ 
harmonization was high on the agenda. The mandatory rules, such as 
minimum capital requirements and disclosure rules, constituted part of 
the initial wave of harmonized rules.43 The array of mandatory legal 
                                                     
39 Under the incorporation regime, the company is not governed by the laws of the state 
of state where the actual center of the companies are, but by the laws of the state 
incorporation.  
40 See Charny (1991). 
41 See Villiers (1998: 28-51) (distinguish four generations of directives: the first 
generation emphasized uniformity and prescription; the second generation supplied a set 
of options which essentially represent the predominant approach in the member states; 
the third generation explicitly left issues to the member states; and the fourth generation 
took the process even further by adopting only a framework model). 
42 See Carney (1997: 318) (arguing that the first generation directives are likely to be 
representative of the dominant legal practices in the member states because their 
adoption required unanimous consent of the member states; Cheffins (1997: 448) (‘the 
EU has typically done little more than superimpose a series of measures on domestic 
regulations already in place’); Halbhuber (2001: 1406) (‘[t]he directives do not purport to 
deal with crucial issues like fiduciary duties, exit, expulsion and redemption, transfer of 
shares etc.’). 
43 The first generation directives include the First and Second Company Law Directives. 
First Council Directive [1968] OJ Spec Ed (I) (disclosure of corporate data); Second 
Council Directive [1977] OJ 26/1 (protection of capital). 
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capital rules, however, seemed to benefit domestic interest groups.44 
Incumbent management may have influenced the EU legislature to 
supply provisions that limit dividend payments and share repurchases so 
as to obtain more leeway to reinvest firm’s profits. Accountants, who 
play a pivotal role in the required valuation, also had a substantial 
interest in exerting influence on the legislative outcome. 
 With the introduction of England and other member states, the second 
wave of directives was arguably more flexible, granting states options to 
comply with the terms of the directives.45 Given the diversity of legal 
regimes, the optional approach ensured that the directives did not 
interfere with the core elements of member states national company law 
rules and hence respected the cooperative agreement.  
 The rigid approach of the first and second generation directives 
quickly showed its limitations. The harmonization of core areas of 
company law, like the structure and responsibility of the board of 
directors, cross-border mergers, representation of employees, and 
bankruptcy procedures, proved to be predictably slow and ineffective.46 
The fundamental disagreements among member states with regard to 
important issues, such as employee participation and the reluctance of 
member states to implement the harmonized rules,47 shows the difficulty 
                                                     
44 See Carney (1997: 324); Enriques and Macey (2001: 1202-1203). 
45 The second generation directives include the Third [1978] OJ L295/36 and Sixth 
Council Directives [1982] OJ L378/47 on Mergers and Split-Offs, Fourth [1978] OJ 
L222/11, Seventh [1983] OJ L193/1 and Eight Council Directives [1984] OJ L126/20 on 
Annual and Consolidated Accounts and the Qualification of Accountants. 
46 See Woolcock (1996: 292). In the words of the Commission (1985: 18): ‘relying on a 
strategy based totally on harmonization would be over-regulatory, would take a long time 
to implement, would be inflexible and could stifle innovation.’ 
47 See Wouters (2000: 275). Germany’s reluctance to implement Council Directive 
(EEC) 90/605 of 8 November 1990, extending the Fourth and Seventh Directive to 
partnerships and limited partnerships with corporate general partners, perfectly 
exemplifies this trend. These hybrid business forms were not within the original scope of 
the Fourth and Seventh Directive. See Fourth Council Directive [1978] OJ L222/11 
(single accounts); Seventh Council Directive [1983] OJ L193/1 (consolidated accounts). 
While some jurisdictions applied these Directives voluntarily to hybrid ‘limited liability 
vehicles’, like the Netherlands, the Commission took the view that it would run counter 
to the spirit and aims of the Fourth and Seventh Directive to allow these vehicles not to 
be subject to Community rules. The limited partnership with a corporate general partner 
(GmbH & Co KG) is particularly popular in Germany. Although the German government 
agreed on further extension of the directives after the European lawmakers announced 
further exemptions available to SMEs, it deferred implementing the amendment. Only 




with touching the autonomy of member state law. For instance, member 
states regularly vetoed directive proposals under Article 100 of the EC 
Treaty (now Article 94), unless a politically acceptable consensus would 
be achieved.48  
 It was clear early, given the legislative setbacks involving the first 
and second generation directives, that the European Commission would 
be unable to remove the most intractable barriers to economic 
integration. While the EU continued to pursue its harmonization strategy, 
policymakers within the Commission set out to design a more 
independent agenda on the basis of Article 308 (ex 235).49 To this end, 
the EC introduced the Regulation of the European Economic Interest 
Grouping (EEIG), which made it possible for firms from different 
member states to develop certain joint activities without having to merge 
or to set up a jointly owned subsidiary.50 The first genuine European 
business form came into existence because it was not detrimental to 
national doctrines and usages and hardly competed against national 
business forms.51 In reality, the EEIG’s restricted objectives and 
references to national law have resulted in a rather unpopular business 
form.52 
 In 1970 the Commission also proposed the introduction of the 
European Company. This legal business form was designed to allow 
firms, operating in two or more member states, the option to employ a 
genuine European business form, meaning that they will be able to move 
                                                                                                                      
government changed the law according to the amending directive. See Edwards (1999: 
124). 
48 See Inman and Rubinfeld (1998: 548) (describing the initial steps toward the economic 
union as decentralized federalism). 
49 Article 308 (ex 235) specifies two preconditions for unification: (1) action by the 
Community should prove necessary to attain; (2) the powers provided in the Treaty are 
insufficient. See Buxbaum and Hopt (1988: 210-212). 
50 The EEIG is adopted in 1985 (Council Reg (EEC) 2137/85 on the European Economic 
Interest Grouping (EEIG) [1985] OJ L199/1). The EEIG creates a European legislative 
framework that provides existing firms with an easy and accessible vehicle for 
restructuring across frontiers.  
51 Cf. Grundmann (1999: 645 fn. 36).  
52 The EEIG is a mirror image of the French Groupement d’Interêt Economique, which 
has proved to be a popular business in the French business community. However, the 
Groupement d’Interêt Economique appears to owe its existence to limitation of the 
French partnership form. See Lutter (1996: 67) (arguing that from a German perspective, 
the promulgation of the EEIG is a mistake). See also Wouters (2000: 261). 
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registered offices from one country to another without needing to 
dissolve the company in the first member state and to formally establish 
it in the second one. The strong resistance of member states to adopt the 
legislation, until recently, reflected their continued preference to retain 
legislative autonomy and control over core areas of company law.53 
 Thus, the early phases of the harmonization process, with its root and 
branch approach, reached its inevitable terminus point with the failure of 
the Fifth, Ninth and Thirteenth Directives, and a new direction was 
required to achieve the aims of European economic integration.54  
 After the Cassis de Dijon judgment, and with the Commission’s 1985 
White Paper as accepted in a Council Resolution of the same year, the 
EU tried to respond to calls for greater flexibility.55 Minimum 
harmonization and mutual recognition formed the so-called ‘new 
approach’ to harmonization.56 The following year, the Single European 
Act (SEA) attempted to resolve possible veto blockages at Council level 
by providing for a consultation procedure and qualified majority 
voting.57 With the second enlargement,58 the EU adopted a new model of 
integration based on centralized federalism,59 which gave the European 
Commission increased agenda-setting power. Between 1986 and 1992, 
the EU adopted the two, third generation directives, concerning the 
                                                     
53 At the outset of the EU, the member states understood that, given the ‘Delaware effect’ 
in the US, the consequences of competitive pressures would be detrimental to their own 
national lawmaking powers and immediately took steps to insulate the (horizontal) threat 
by establishing a federal type institution (European Commission) that undertook to 
harmonize areas of company law (without touching the core). While the original 
legislative strategy satisfied the objectives of the member states, the European 
Commission expanded their own lawmaking agenda by developing truly ‘European’ 
company forms. To the extent this (vertical) approach limited the lawmaking discretion 
of member states, their support for top down lawmaking was gradually eroded.  
54 High Level Group of Company Law Experts (2002). See also De Kluiver (1995: 300). 
55 See Case 120/78 Rewe Zentral AG v Bundesmonopolverwaltung für Branntwein 
[‘Cassis de Dijon’] [1979] ECR 1979; European Commission (1985).  
56 See Majone (1993a: 1-3) (‘[t]he immediate reason for introducing this new strategy 
was to reduce the burden on the Commission in harmonizing national rules.’). 
57 See Inman and Rubinfeld (1998: 549) (‘[b]orn in part from the frustration over the 
slow pace of integration of the advantages such reforms might have in combating 
Europe’s declining economic fortunes (known as ‘Eurosclerosis’), the ten members of 
the Community put aside the Luxembourg Compromise and decentralized federalism and 
adopted in 1986 the Single European Act (SEA) and a new institutional structure closely 
approximating that of centralized federalism.’). Cf. Streit and Mussler (1998: 104-105). 
58 In 1986, Spain, Portugal and Greece entered the EU. 




disclosure of branches and formation of single member companies, 
which were marginal to domestic company law arrangements.60 
 Despite greater flexibility under the ‘new approach’, standards 
imposed remain fairly high. Market regulation proves inadequate to 
market evolutions. Lacking solid foundations for legitimacy, the 
European Union remains a forum for member states eager to impose or 
defend their own legislative products, and hence their own regulatory 
policies and legal doctrines.61 EU ordering continues to be subject to 
consensus, and to compromise lawmaking.62 Fragmentation and the lack 
of a general concept on the part of Brussels may be suggested as a best 
case scenario. The harmonization process cannot be explained on 
efficiency grounds only, but should be viewed as a response to pressures 
from several interest groups wanting to protect the existing legal 
framework and frustrate competitive lawmaking.63 
 A new stage in the evolution of federalism was characterized by the 
development of the subsidiarity principle, which member states 
embraced in the 1992 Maastricht Treaty on the European Union.64 With 
regard to areas that are not of the exclusive competence of the European 
Union,65 the subsidiarity principle embodied in Article 5 of the Treaty 
commands the decision to locate competence at EU level or at member 
                                                     
60 Eleventh Council Directive [1989] OJ L395/36; Twelfth Council Directive [1989] OJ 
L395/40. 
61 See Heritier et al. (1996: 149). Cf. Caruso (1997) (arguing that entrenched in legal 
formalism, obstinate in the defence of the doctrinal coherence of their codes and 
unwilling to discuss the political merits of their consolidated policies, European legal 
actors manage to slow down, and even at times to halt, the process of private law 
integration); Halbhuber (2001: 1409-1411) (arguing that domestic doctrinal structures 
appear to play an important role in shaping the German understanding of European 
company law materials). 
62 See Scharpf (1999). 
63 See Carney (1997: 317 and 329). 
64 Besides constraining the Commission’s role through the subsidiarity principle, the 
Maastricht Treaty also introduced the co-decision procedure. As a consequence, the 
European Union’s decision-making structure closely resembles the constitutional form of 
democratic federalism in which central government policies are agreed to by a simple 
majority of elected representatives from lower-tier governments. See Inman and 
Rubinfeld (1997: 50-53); (1998: 550). 
65 Areas within the exclusive competence of the Union are subject to the proportionality 
test. Article 5 §3 of the Treaty provides that ‘any action by the Community shall not go 
beyond what is necessary to achieve objectives of the Treaty’. 
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state level. Rather than listing the competencies of the Union and 
member states, the subsidiarity principle provides for an efficiency test 
to determine competencies and, more crucially, to constrain the 
Commission’s executive power.66 Recently, though, the Commission 
responded by proposing a new approach in governance and regulation at 
EU level that would reinforce the principle of subsidiarity, but at the 
same time strengthen the role of the European Commission as a political 
driving force.67  
 The European Commission, building on the principle of subsidiarity 
and proportionality, has introduced a new type of directive, based on 
general principles. Despite the further flexibilization of directives 
(moving from the provision of certain minimum standards to a 
framework model for directives), promulgating directives remained 
much like running the gauntlet.68 For instance, the collapse in 2001 of 
the Thirteenth Directive, on takeovers, exemplifies the deeply rooted 
conflict between some member states over the direction and pace of the 
directives.69  
 At the national level, there are noticeably few incentives for 
lawmakers to modify regulatory design or reform inefficient rules 
because of legislative inertia and special interest.70 Very generally, the 
                                                     
66 First of all, it has to be determined whether there is a power under the Treaty to take 
action. The subsidiarity principle then determines whether and how the Community may 
act. It must be shown that the objectives of the proposed action cannot be sufficiently 
achieved by the member states. The finding must then justify the further conclusion that 
in view of the measure the objective can be better achieved at Community level. 
Eventually, the proportionality test as defined in §3 of Article 5 has to be satisfied. See 
Micklitz and Weatherill (1997: 16). See also Bermann (1994: 334) (‘[t]he drafters’ 
apparent purpose was to reassure Member State populations, and subcommunities within 
those populations, the Community’s seemingly inexorable march toward greater legal 
and political integration would not needlessly trample their legitimate claims to 
democratic self-governance and cultural diversity.’).  
67 See European Commission (2001b). See Cygan (2002: 240) (‘[t]he main criticism 
against the contents of the White Paper is that it promotes the institutional self-interest of 
the Commission, at the expense of substantive concerns of many EU citizens.’). 
68 See Deakin (2001: 192-195). 
69 Cf. Forstinger (2002: 34); McCahery and Renneboog (2003: 46-51). 
70 Powerful insiders that derive private benefits from blockholding arrangements and 
non-stakeholder interests have few incentives to optimize national corporate governance 
regimes for the benefit of shareholders. See, e.g., Roe (2001) (noting that as nations with 
norms and corporate rules that harm shareholders become more competitive through 
customs unions and single-currency areas, pressure on these norms, these corporate law 




differences in the normative arrangements between the continental and 
common law systems partly explain the deeply rooted conflict between 
the member states over the direction and pace of the harmonization 
program. These insights provide key clues as to why only a relatively 
small number of EU-level initiatives have been heralded as major 
breakthroughs in the field of company. 
 
4. THE EUROPEAN COMPANY: CHALLENGING THE STRATEGY? 
Recently, after more than thirty years of negotiation and bickering, the 
member states finally reached agreement on yet another truly genuine 
European business form: the European Company (Societas Europea, or 
SE). The SE statute, which entered into force in October 2004, gives 
firms operating in two or more member states the option to form a 
European company.71 According to this view, a menu of European 
business forms could create a legal framework that helps firms to set up 
and develop at a European level, to create an economic environment 
through which firms can reach their full development in the internal 
market, and, more crucially, to promote cooperation between firms 
located in different regions of the European Union. 
 The EU initially pursued an exhaustive and comprehensive legislative 
measure for the creation of a European Company based on the German 
Aktiengesellschaft. The aim was to create uniform legislation for the 
internal governance without reference to national company laws. 
Although this approach should have been possible, it was ultimately 
shelved in the 1980s, when the European Community replaced the draft 
with framework legislation that referred extensively to national 
legislation. It took until the mid-1990s, when a group of experts, chaired 
by former Commission President Etienne Davignon, produced a report 
outlining a compromise solution regarding labor participation.72 By 
December 2000, the political difficulties surrounding labor co-
determination and board structure were resolved when the Council 
adopted the legislative measures governing the European Company. 
                                                     
71 Council Regulation 2157/2001/EC [2001] OJ L 294/1. 
72 See Keller (2002). 
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 The Statute provides a number of means through which legal persons 
or corporate bodies may form a European Company.73 Besides formation 
requirements, the Statute stipulates that the internal governance of the 
European Company will be regulated by national law of the place of its 
registration. In effect, the legislation allows firms to select either a one- 
or two-tier board.74 Finally, there are a number of provisions, set forth in 
the Directive on Involvement of Employees, that detail the level of 
employee involvement in a company.75 A special negotiation procedure 
for worker participation must be followed upon the creation of a 
European Company.76 The Directive distinguishes between information 
and consultation, on the one hand, and participation, on the other hand. 
The employee representatives should be informed about material 
decisions and given the opportunity to influence the deliberation and 
decision-making process. In many cases, the employees’ representatives 
are permitted to consent on the composition of the supervisory board 
(two-tier board) or board of management (one-tier board).  
 Despite the relative absence of mandatory rules, the Regulation, 
which should hold out some cost-saving benefits for some European 
firms, there are some other legal difficulties which should play an 
important role in determining whether companies are likely to adopt the 
form. First, many European lawyers have expressed skepticism about 
whether the new legislative measures will lead to significant changes in 
corporate practice.77 For example, the proposed statute excludes a large 
number of areas relevant to businesses operating in two states, all of 
                                                     
73   Generally the European Company may be formed by consequence of: (1) a merger of 
two or more existing companies originating from at least two member states; (2) the 
formation of a holding company promoted by public or private limited companies; (3) 
the formation of jointly held subsidiary; and (4) the conversion of an existing public 
limited company. See article 2 and Title II of the Regulation. 
74   Article 38(b) of the Regulation. 
75  Provisions for participation of employees in the European Company, See Council 
Directive 2001/86/EC [2001] OJ L294/22.  
76 Section II of the Directive. 
77  See Springael (2002) (arguing that the European Company is not a uniform company 
type, as originally intended, but instead a ‘national European Company’); Hampton 
(2002: 1) (arguing that without an EU-wide regime for tax, freedom of movement 





which continue to be governed by national legislation.78 Nevertheless, 
some argue that it is relatively easy to employ the European Company as 
a migration tool, especially when it is formed by merger.79 However, the 
multiple layers of regulation, i.e., the statute itself, the laws 
implementing the European Company at a national level, national laws 
of the member states, and the European Company’s constituent 
documents, which govern the European Company are likely to lead to 
uncertainty, thereby decreasing rather than increasing the European 
Company’s attractiveness. Second, the failure of the European Statute to 
address the problem of taxation will clearly undermine the number of 
firms incorporating as European companies.80 The argument for the 
attractiveness of the European Company is premised on the ability of a 
European Company to transfer its registered office to another member 
state. Although there is reason to expect that strong market pressures 
may lead some companies to reincorporate in jurisdictions with more 
hospitable company law regimes, we expect that the absence of a 
specific tax regime, particularly with regard to cross-border real seat 
transfers, will be a significant impediment to its use by a majority of 
firms.81 Third, some companies may also be deterred by the complexity 
of the process of setting up a European Company. In particular, the need 
to enter into negotiations with employee representatives will likely be a 
bottleneck.82 Many firms may be uncomfortable with the idea of worker 
involvement in the re-incorporation process. Accordingly, even if a class 
of firms would have sufficient incentives to convert to the European 
Company form, we are skeptical that there are sufficient cost benefits to 
encourage managers to adopt this legal business form.  
 To be sure, member states could take steps to make the European 
Company more attractive by adopting clear and effective provisions of 
laws that specifically implement EU measures relating to European 
                                                     
78 The Regulation addresses the Formation (Title II), the Structure of the SE (Title III), 
Annual Account and Consolidated Accounts (Title IV) and Winding Up, Liquidation, 
Insolvency and Cessation of Payments (Title V). 
79 Title II, section 2 of the Regulation. See also Enriques (2003); De Kluiver et al. (2004: 
62-63). 
80 See Bolkestein (2003: 43-44). It is worth pointing out that, unlike earlier drafts, the 
Statute lacks any tax provisions at the EU level. 
81 See Thommes (2004: 23-25). 
82 See Davies (2003: 67; 81-82); Hopt (2003: 53-54). 
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Companies and, by doing so, engage in regulatory competition. 
However, although the first European Companies may already be 
formed, there are no signals that the member states have actually 
engaged in competition-based lawmaking in connection with the 
European Company or public corporations.83 
 In addition, we are skeptical whether the European Company will 
eventually become an attractive vehicle for company law shopping 
within the European Union.84 The numerous corporate governance 
reforms (that started in 2001 in the wake of the Enron, Ahold and 
Parmalat scandals) which are high on the policy agenda leave the laws 
governing the European Company as more of a backwater.85 That is not 
to say that policymakers should disregard the European Company. 
Rather, member states should arguably be on their guard against other 
jurisdictions trying to undermine their attractiveness by coming to the 
fore with a set of rules that are more ideally suited to public 
corporations. This issue becomes more pressing now that in the new era 
of corporate accountability regulatory groups and governing 
organizations have either adopted or modified existing corporate 
governance legislation and codes, which often establish mandatory goals 
and guidelines for the effective governance of publicly traded 
corporations.86 Although the European Company compromise offers a 
rigid and unattractive system87, the possibility of forum-shopping, 
through cross-border mergers, could in the long run provide incentives to 
modernize national company law legislation, thereby eroding 
cumbersome and intrusive national laws.88 Recently, however, some 
                                                     
83 One may argue that French company law could obtain cost saving benefits as a result 
of the introduction of the European Company Statute since firms can easily opt into the 
flexible corporate business form, namely the Société par Actions Simplifiée (SAS) 
regulation. Financieele Dagblad (2004a). 
84 Cf. Garrido (2003). 
85 European Commission (2004); McCahery and Vermeulen (2005 forthcoming). 
86 See Hertig and McCahery (2004). 
87 See Kübler (2004). 
88 It follows, perhaps, that the ECJ’s recent judgments in Centros, Überseering and 
Inspire Art – and their implications for the real seat theory – could, along with the 
pressure from the introduction of the European Company, induce the European Union to 
embark on a new, market-based approach to the process of business organization 
lawmaking. See McCahery and Vermeulen (2001); (2004). Now that the EU opened its 
door to new member states, national lawmakers must be on their guard against highly 
incentivized central and eastern European legislatures which may be considering modern 




policymakers have suggested linking the European Company Statute to a 
European corporate governance code could provide a more efficient way 
to induce convergence of best practice norms within the EU.89 If national 
lawmakers were to shift to this strategy, we expect two potential benefits 
would arise: (1) through linkage the member states’ codes would be left 
untouched and thereby divergence would be respected;90 and (2) the 
prospect of regulatory competition by means of the European Company 
would be substantially diminished. We conclude, then, that were the 
member states to embrace the linkage approach to the European 
Company Statute, this would serve to reinforce the non-competitive 
equilibrium within EU company law, a result that many lawmakers 
would appear to support.   
 
4 CONCLUSION 
This article has pointed out that the potential for the member states to 
engage in competitive lawmaking is limited. On this basis, we argued 
that member states, upon the entrance to the EU, entered into a long-term 
non-competition agreement regarding company lawmaking, thereby 
preventing the ‘Delaware-effect’.  
 Section 2 explains the Delaware-effect. It clarifies that Delaware does 
currently not engage in regulatory competition with the other US states. 
Due to a series of historical coincidences, Delaware can rely on its 
dominant position in the market for companies. Delaware closely 
resembles a monopolistic lawmaker possessing market power and 
‘competitive’ advantages that other states cannot replicate, which act as 
substantial barriers to other states wishing to enter the market for out-of-
state companies. 
 In the EU, the harmonization program for publicly held companies 
set in place mechanisms that protected the lawmaking autonomy of 
member states. Since these firms were most likely to engage in cross-
border activities, re-incorporation strategies could put pressure on 
domestic lawmakers to conform to their peer jurisdictions. We have 
argued that member states are unwilling, given their long tradition of 
independence, to relinquish their lawmaking autonomy in this area. All 
                                                     
89 See High Level Group of Company Law Experts (2004: 67). 
90 See Financial Times (2004b). 
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steps taken by member states point in the same direction: to avoid a 
‘European Delaware’. The commitment of member states to respect the 
cooperative lawmaking equilibrium is reflected in the following 
observations: (1) the first and second generation company law directives 
restated the dominant legal practices in the member states; (2) the third 
and fourth generation directives became less detailed and precise leaving 
the important issues to the member state’s discretion; (3) federal 
intervention through supranational provisions for truly European 
company forms faced severe objections and are, until now, not very 
successful. Our analysis questions whether the compromise legislation 
regarding the European Company could actually serve to cause irritation 
to the non-competitive equilibrium by opening the door to regulatory 
arbitrage and eventually competitive lawmaking. Even though many 
commentators cast doubt about the beneficial aspects of opting-into the 
European Company, we should, nevertheless, not rule out the possibility 
of firms making use of this structure to circumvent costly national 
company law rules.91 For this to become viable, however, the European 
Union must first introduce an EU-wide tax regime for the European 
Company, and also bring about a common EU corporate tax base.92 We 
suspect, however, that there are few political incentives for lawmakers to 
pass legislation that might serve to disrupt the EU’s non-competitive 
equilibrium in company law. 
 
                                                     
91 The introduction of the European Company has stimulated discussion about the 
transformation of board-level labor representation regimes within the EU (Wall Street 
Journal Europe 2004). For instance, the possibility of circumventing the rigid labor 
representation laws through a merger with an English public company has given 
company law reformers more political leverage in their efforts to alter home country 
legislation (Financieele Dagblad 2004b).  
92 The recent meeting of the ECOFIN Council on 7 December 2004 expressed support 
for the European Commission’s efforts to facilitate cross-border reorganizations by 
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